Conclusions

 

Russia�s foreign policy, fluctuating between ambitions to form a strategic partnership with the USA and other Western countries, and protest against certain Western foreign policies, including NATO�s expansion and bombing of Yugoslavia, was not entirely realistic given Russia's abilities and goals. Russia's leadership often participated in international affairs just for the sake of participation, without considering the consequences. As Viktor Kremenyuk argues, Putin�s administration has now decided to differentiate four foreign policy directions � West, East, South, and the �near abroad�.[79] Behind this new approach is an old idea � while Russia lacks serious achievements in its Western policy, it should compensate for these shortcomings by developing relations with countries that would welcome such development. The years 2000 and 2001 demonstrated that to realise this ambition the current Russian government attempts to restore Soviet-type relations with North Korea and the People�s Republic of China, as a reaction to its impotence during and after the Yugoslavia crisis.

 

Despite the widespread perception of Russia�s Eurasian nature, and a common description of it as simultaneously belonging to two continents, Russia�s ruling elite and most Russians do not see themselves as part of Asia. By tradition still involved in Central Asian politics, they usually tend to neglect processes taking place in the Asia-Pacific. The attempt to develop a Eurasian dimension that would integrate European and Asian priorities is rather a novelty for Russia. L.Titarenko and V.Mikheev, Russian experts on Chinese and Korean politics, argue that Russian society, at least its politically active part, has already started reconsidering Russia�s place in the Asia-Pacific and pays increasing interest to cooperation with East Asian nations.[80] However, Russian foreign policy continues to be Western-oriented, the Asian approach often playing a supporting role to the European dimension.

 

Taking this into consideration, it is not surprising that another switch in focus emerged in Russia after September 11, with a new attempt to emphasise its European direction. It is obvious that the September 11 terrorist attacks against the USA were unexpected events. Nevertheless, Vladimir Putin for the second time tried to use a catastrophe and a war to his advantage. The 1999 Moscow blasts that killed several hundred people, together with the strange failure of the government and secret services to respond in time to the Chechen invasion of Dagestan, provided fertile soil for renewal of the Chechen war. That war became a cornerstone of Putin�s career, and opened the door to the presidency. The current anti-terrorist war again appeared beneficial for Putin. Moscow�s unconditional support of the US-led military operation in Afghanistan made Putin a key partner to world leaders.

 

Yelena Tregubova argues that this move has cost Putin nothing[81] - he simply made the right choice from among the options presented by President Bush - �Are you with us or with the terrorists?�. In fact, many politicians in the West and in Russia expected that Putin would yield to pressure from the military industrial lobby and secret service, and choose cooperation with the so-called �pariah-nations�. These expectations made Putin�s pro-Western choice even more significant. Russia's leadership apparently decided that turning into America's best friend would eliminate all Western criticism of its domestic policy, allowing it to concentrate on internal power struggles and take Chechnya off the international agenda.

 

However, the situation is not so simple. In 2001, which was so sensational in terms of contacts with Northeast Asian nations, there appeared to be a series of failures and reluctant concessions in Russian foreign policy. The USA withdrew from the ABM Treaty, which Moscow had considered the cornerstone of the global security system. Russian officials had discussed the problem with their Chinese counterparts, and the two nations even formed a special group to coordinate their policies, to try to prevent the USA from withdrawing and launching a new missile defense program. After September 11 these discussions were abandoned. At the same time Russia agreed that the US military can use former Soviet military bases in Central Asia for the antiterrorist war (this move was not met with delight in Beijing). Besides, Moscow decided to close its last two bases in Cuba and Vietnam, and made it clear that it would no longer object to the Baltic states� joining NATO, meaning that NATO will now cross the former Soviet border.

 

These Gorbachev-style unilateral concessions were used as a tool to achieve a real status of partnership with Western nations. Moscow recognised its weakness, and tried to exchange its last bargaining chips for a higher status in international relations and a free hand in its domestic policy. Some observers called this a �realistic� policy.[82] However, in the past several months Russia acted in contradiction to its basic foreign policy and national security documents. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of June 2000[83] is oriented towards preserving Russia�s status as a great power, as one of the influential centres of the modern world. It confirms the priority of �the conventional norms of international law�, the goals and principles of the UN Charter, and speaks of equal and partnership relations between states as a basis of international relations. According to the concept, Russia sees itself as an active player in the process of fundamental and dynamic changes in the modern world, and wants to exercise a primary influence on the formation of a new world order.

 

Instead of protecting its position as one of the influential centres in the modern world, Moscow for the first time tried to drop its aspirations to preserve superpower status. Unfortunately, for Putin�s administration, the USA, despite all the concessions offered by Russia, does not seem eager to bargain on the topics of human rights and democracy, and very quickly resumed its criticism of the war in Chechnya.[84] Moscow also failed with its expectations of US non-interference into the Georgian-Russian conflict. On the other hand, it has made serious efforts to prevent a US attack against Iraq.

 

Under such conditions one can expect further Russian attempts to intensify cooperation with the Northeast Asian nations, which is still dependant on the Western component of Russia�s foreign policy. If so, such cooperation will continue to be manifestation of a kind of self-sufficiency. But, in fact, it will still be based on negative premises, on the desire to make the US at least uncomfortable about Russian foreign ties. A real self-sufficient and long-term basis for the strong �Eastern� policy can be created with Russia�s economic integration in East Asia. Such integration can provide a set of mutual interests that would �cement� Russian ties in Asia and establish a new model of Russia�s presence in the region. There are real possibilities for such development, which at present could embrace energy and infrastructure projects. Apparently, only mutually beneficial cooperation can provide Russia�s dialogue with Asian nations with a continuous logic and sustainability.

 

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Endnotes