The background of Russia's current Eastern policy
Putins Eastern policy seems rather controversial. On
the one hand, it contradicts the common political vision of the Russian
political elite. Dmitri Trenin
argues that for centuries the Russian authorities have regarded their Far
Eastern neighbours with a sense of superiority and a pinch of contempt. At the
same time, all factions of the Russian political elite, irrespective of their
attitude toward the US, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the
European Union (EU), market economy, democracy, human rights, etc., are fixated
on the West.[13] This
view seems correct. For example, the prognosis for 2002 offered by Russian
economic guru Yevgeny Yasin
suggested that Russia would expand its cooperation with NATO, while
steps could be taken to transform NATO from an anti-Communist alliance to a
security tool to protect the Northern Ring, including Russia and Japan.[14]
On the other hand, the Eastern reorientation was
prepared by Russias foreign policy development during the last decade. The origin of the initial changes in Soviet/Russian policy
towards the Asia Pacific in general and Northeast Asia in
particular may be found in the Gorbachev period of the late 1980s. To meet his
two major objectives of attracting foreign investment (Japanese, and later South
Korean) to his ambiguous programme for economic
development in Siberia and the Russian Far East and of historic reconciliation
with China, Gorbachev prepared the basis for Moscows new Asian policy by
disengaging from most regional conflicts (Afghanistan and Indochina), normalising relations with China, and recognising
the Republic of Korea. He also succeeded in initiating dialogue on a wide range
of issues with Japan. However, the concentration of efforts on China, Japan, and Korea resulted in narrowing the sphere of Soviet policy in
the Asia-Pacific to the Northeast Asian sub-region. There was no comprehensive
strategy towards the region as a whole, however, evidenced by the predominant
orientation towards a bilateral basis in developing Russian contacts in
Northeast Asia, and the low level of cohesion between its actions in the
region.
A complicated combination of diverse factors and
trends made for inconsistencies in the evolution of Russian policy-making
towards Northeast Asia after the USSRs collapse in December 1991. Initially, policy-making
was seriously affected by the Atlantic-oriented line. This entailed the pursuit
of the goal of joining the club of Western democracies and becoming integrated
into the democratic international community (the so-called Kozyrev
doctrine). In this context, East Asia looked less
important and less promising. Gorbachevs major partners in the region, the Republic of Korea and mainland China, were very circumspect toward the new Russia. Seoul had
already achieved its basic political goals of recognition and establishing
diplomatic relations. Besides, South Korea shared with the West a common admiration of Gorbachev
and a skepticism towards Yeltsin, and the feeling that the world owed much to
Gorbachevs Soviet Union, but nothing to Yeltsins postcommunist
Russia. Korea did not participate in the international
campaign to relieve Russia's economic hardships in early 1992, and was the
first to stress the uncertain status of loans to the Soviet Union inherited by
Russia (Soviet debt to Korea was US$1.5 billion) and froze the undisbursed part of its US$3 billion loan.
China looked even more problematic. It was among the
nations which recognised the State Emergency
Committee in the attempted coup dtat of August 1991. It was deeply suspicious of the
new Russian reformism and possible effects of the demise of Soviet socialism on
its own future. In addition, Russia's efforts to integrate into the democratic community
coincided with a strong campaign in the West to protect human rights in China after the Tiananmen incident. Russia's participation in the crusade aggravated relations
with Beijing.
In these circumstances, only Japan was perceived as an attractive partner. It was a
member of the Western community with an influential voice in international
financial institutions, an ally badly needed by Russia. Initially, Russia had a vision of quickly settling bilateral relations
with an alternative to Gorbachevs policy. Yeltsins advisors on Japanese issues
promised success. Therefore the initial attention paid to Japan reflected not a regional policy, but a bilateral
approach influenced by Atlanticism. Nevertheless, in
a sense, early 1992 offered an opportunity for elaborating a radically new
Russian approach to Northeast Asia, with an emphasis on relations with Japan
integrated into the Atlantic-oriented Kozyrev doctrine.
However, this met fierce domestic political
opposition, first of all from the Communists and Vladimir Zhirinovskys
Liberal-Democratic Party, who tried to play the card of patriotism to attract
more voters. From the very beginning, this foreign policy line was attacked by
opposition groups, which insisted on a more versatile Asian dimension, as
opposed to then foreign minister Kozyrevs emphasis
on cooperation with the West. The Asian partners favoured were China and India, rather than Japan. The Kurile Islands dispute
complicating Russo-Japanese relations enabled the opposition to identify it as
the most important area for an assault on the foreign policy of the
presidential administration. It should be noted that Japans inflexible position at the time meant that the
solution of the Northern
territories problem
was a prerequisite for any other discussions. These moves deprived President
Yeltsin of any space for domestic political manoeuver
to secure economic advantages by settling the dispute. In the end, afraid to
add to the territorial debate, and thereby intensify confrontation with the
opposition in general and the Supreme Soviet in particular over a wide range of
issues, Yeltsins administration removed Japan from the list of Russias top priorities by 1993.
From late 1992 to early 1993, the Yeltsin
administrations major attention in the Asia-Pacific turned to broader regional
problems. It particularly concentrated on participation in regional
institutions. Russias formal entry to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with its concern with
arms control and confidence-building measures - traditionally high priorities
for Moscow combined with increased tension over North Korea's nuclear build-up, enabled Russia to initiate proposal of a 6+2 conference on the Korean Peninsula in order to upgrade its role as mediator in a
conflict situation. At the same time, the activation of Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) presented a chance to promote an intensive regional policy,
irrespective of complications in bilateral relations. This new potential
guideline for Russias Asia Pacific policy seemed appropriately timed.
1993 revealed strong domestic nostalgia for Russias 'great power' role. There was also disillusion over
the earlier unquestioning enthusiasm about cooperation with the West and
disappointment with the level of the Wests economic support. The 'Oriental
alternative' in foreign policy grew increasingly popular. Expectations for
Russias increased activity in the Asia-Pacific region, based on independent
Russian initiatives, though not confronting the West, and aimed at mutually
acceptable solutions, can be regarded an important landmark in Russian foreign
policy. These efforts to change from unquestioning support for American
strategic initiatives, without challenging the general orientation towards
close cooperation with the West, were a significant development.
This broader approach was undermined by the inability
to obtain rapid admission to the forum of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.[15]
This delay isolated Russia from general trends towards regional economic cooperation and, perhaps
even more detrimental to national ambitions, prevented its participation in
Asia-Pacific summits, thereby restricting Moscow to a low political profile in Asian affairs.
Russias new policy in the Asia Pacific encountered yet
another obstacle the lack of support for Russias 6+2 formula for the international conference on
Korean nuclear issues. Though never flatly rejected, the idea did not succeed
in winning support even from ROK president Kim Young Sam, whom Russia regarded as a real supporter. The formation of the
Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), which
opted for US nuclear reactors and proposed only a minor role for Russia, became the obstacle to establishing an active
profile in the Asia-Pacific.
Despite efforts to revive its strong influence in
international affairs, Russia was unable to secure a leading position in shaping Asian politics. One
of its basic shortcomings was its lack of resources, primarily financial, for
exerting a strong influence. A second, and no less important, point was that Russia lacked a network of potential partners in Asia. This is a result of the former Soviet Union's alienation
within the region, and the loss of former allies, or cooling of relations with
them. No new paradigm for bilateral Russian relations with Asian nations was
yet elaborated, nor were sufficient efforts being made to build them. Moscows Euro-centric vision and efforts to transplant
European solutions onto Asian soil only added to the problems.
As noted above, Russias Asian policy is largely viewed as a function of its
Western line. On this point, Vladimir Baranovsky is
right to argue that Russia views as potential assets its perceived commonality of interests with
some of its Asian neighbours, and the possibility of
forging short- and long-term alliances on specific issues, especially in view
of its present weakness and the disappointment of its expectations of
rapprochement with the West.[16]
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