Reassessment of Russia's approach to the West

 

The mid-1990s saw the growing gap in perceptions and Russia�s alienation from the West. After 1993, the tendency in Russian foreign policy to move away from the �romanticism� of Atlantic cooperation to a new self-assertiveness gradually increased. Together with the feeling of isolation in world affairs, unclear prospects for the CIS and failure to solve the Chechen crisis, came an intention to distance itself from the West and reject the model of an American-led international community.� Russia�s leadership also insisted on the need for a multipolar post-cold war international system.

 

The 1999 Yugoslavia crisis signalled a new era in post-Cold War international development, and eventually in Russian foreign policy. It clearly demonstrated the USA�s resolve to establish political control all over the world, including over those �pariah nations� that rejected cooperation with the USA. Unexpectedly, Serbia and Iraq did not give up in the face of American might. As a result, what initially seemed to be a virtual war of the �tail wagging-the-dog� turned into a real war with real victims and real destruction. It was Russia that opened the way for anti-American resistance, by asserting an independent line in foreign affairs.

 

After Andrei Kozyrev�s resignation as Foreign Minister in January 1996, there were attempts to reassess Russia's position in the world and to build its foreign policy around specific Russian national interests, even if this created conflict with the USA. This new course was associated with Yevgeny Primakov, who succeeded Kozyrev as Foreign Minister. Unlike his predecessor, Primakov enjoyed support from the majority of Russia's political elite. This mirrored a growing consensus, which he shared but did not initiate, that neither in Bosnia nor Iraq, nor in Kosovo, should the American �sheriff� enjoy too broad authority.[17] Primakov demonstrated an interesting achievement - Russia can assume an anti-US stance on certain questions, but does not become the West's enemy. For example, Russia criticised US strikes against alleged terrorist bases in Sudan and Afghanistan as well as the joint Anglo-American operation against Iraq. On the other hand, Primakov's gesture in turning�� his aircraft back while en route to Washington received massive domestic support. The Balkan war revealed a high level of anti-US sentiment in Russia.

 

Richard Pipes has suggested that emotions prevailed over common sense when Boris Yeltsin identified the United States as the bully responsible for the bombing of Serbia, and even threatened a general war as a result[18]. Indeed, the first Russian reaction to the Yugoslav crisis was hysterical. Some politicians proposed arms sales to Belgrade, putting nuclear missiles on alert, and other sabre-rattling measures. Moreover, a group of ships with cargoes of S-300PMU-1, Russia's most advanced air defence system, were despatched to the Mediterranean.[19] Since NATO would do its best to prevent their delivery to Yugoslavia, a military clash seemed inevitable.� The order was cancelled the day before the ships were scheduled to leave. All these actions constituted a hectic search for an appropriate answer. Russia later confined itself to political measures, with increasingly strong denunciations of NATO's actions.

 

It is difficult to agree that Russia�s tough stance on Yugoslavia was purely emotional. It was more substantial than this, a result of the different vision of the world and a different manner of assessing international events. The overwhelming majority of Russians did not see the Serbs as �tyrannizing a minority within their own borders�, as Pipes put it, nor did they believe that the USA initiated aggression against Yugoslavia solely for humanitarian reasons.� They saw it as a dress rehearsal before establishing US world domination and dismantling the entire post-WWII system of international relations.[20]

 

What was perceived to be NATO�s aggression against Yugoslavia coincided with the emergence in Russia of a refutation of America as a way of life. It was possibly the deepest hostile feeling for decades. An article titled �Goodbye, AMERICA�[21] published in Ogonyok, a magazine oriented towards intellectuals, was representative of this trend. It received a broad response, and clearly reflected feelings dominant among Russians. The author argued that the �romance� with America, half fiction, half blind adoration, was over. While the two governments fought the Cold War, the average Russian did not care about it, remembering that America was an ally during WWII, later learning about jazz, Marilyn Monroe and Coca-Cola. American fashion and fiction became more and more popular, and when the �iron curtain� lifted slightly, movies gave the impression that there was indeed a heaven on earth. After Gorbachev�s reforms, little by little the realisation came that this image of America was false, and that the USA really had been a rival in the undeclared forty-year war. America won that war, and became easy to access. However, now more and more people find America dull, do not believe in it, its way of life and ideas, and are suspicious of everything coming from it. It is no longer seen as a country of truth and freedom.[22] They loved America when the two countries were enemies, but now are awaiting America�s demise.

 

This attitude was a result of the reform difficulties, debt crisis, general post-imperial shock, and growing cultural inconsistency. However, it might have been less bitter. As Maxim Sokolov, a popular Russian commentator, put it, the major result of the peacekeeping operation launched by the USA and NATO in the Balkans was achieved with the first bomb.[23] Before that, only radical patriots claimed that the West, especially the USA, was a bitter enemy seeking to weaken Russia, but after the attack, broad social groups in Russia came to share this opinion. The USA and the �aggressive NATO bloc� again became �potential rivals�, and regained the place they had occupied in Russian military doctrine during the Cold War. If Western strategists wanted to raise anti-Western sentiments in Russia to the highest pitch they could not do it better than President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had, Sokolov argued.[24] He did not hesitate to call this policy a demonstration of US�s absolute inadequacy to meet the conditions of the post-Cold War world.

 

It is not surprising that the air attacks against Yugoslavia appeared to be the first event that drove all political forces, from leftists to liberals, to similar conclusions. The bombing was denounced across the political spectrum. The popular view was that, in casting away the UN mechanism, the USA and its NATO allies were creating a new system of international relations, which could be dangerous for all nations, including NATO members themselves. Russia's Defence Minister Igor Sergeev stated that Moscow assessed NATO's new strategy as a threat to its security. According to the Russian military, a threat could result from NATO's intention of exceeding the bounds of self-defence and expanding its operational zone to the entire world. NATO�s plans to deal not only with aggression against its members, but with any crisis that might affect their interests, and the fact that NATO does not consider it obligatory to receive a mandate from the UN or OSCE is seen as the most dangerous factor. The war NATO launched in Europe confirmed these suspicions. The core of the Russian defence concept, - that Russia will not be involved in a major military conflict in the foreseeable future, - was no more axiomatic.

 

Despite losing key elements of the military-industrial complex, such as the Nikolaev shipyards, and the diminishing finance available for spending on weapons, Russia tries to keep its military-industrial complex in competition with the West (and the military-industrial complex, lacking serious attempts by the government to reform it, forms a strong anti-Western line in Russian society). In early 1999 Russia began to deploy regiments of highly sophisticated TOPOL-M intercontinental ballistic missiles, two years ahead of schedule.[25]

 

In October 1998 President Yeltsin commissioned 'Peter the Great', the largest atomic missile cruiser ever built.[26] The defence industry also turned out a new stealth bomber, and it is estimated that Russia continues to build new submarines at rates equal to the days of the Cold War.[27]

 

In another development, in May 1999 Yeltsin signed special documents, which gave the green light to a new generation of nuclear weapons.[28] Together with later changes to the military doctrine, the envisaged radical modernisation of Russia's entire nuclear arsenal made it clear that the goal behind that was to make a limited nuclear war possible.

 

The plan aimed to create the capability to strike �non-strategic� nuclear blows anywhere in the world in the same way as the USA use cruise missiles and precision bombs. Some ten thousand tactical low-power nuclear units were expected to become leverage against �NATO expansion in Europe�, as it will close the gap in conventional arms between Russia and NATO member countries.

 

The existence of low-power nuclear units makes the threat of using nuclear weapons even more real, because it provides the opportunity to avoid global nuclear confrontation with total destruction. While the plan was proposed several years before, it was the Yugoslavia crisis which promoted its implementation.[29]

 

The United States, believing that the events of 1989-1992 had permanently transformed the world so that only the American geopolitical understanding was viable, resisted Russia's attempts to secure a sphere of influence even at a regional level. As a result Russia became more uneasy and aggressive. The renewal of the Chechen war in 1999, to a large degree prompted by Russia�s internal political crisis, brought new tensions in Russian-Western relations. At the same time, on the eve of parliamentary elections, Russian politicians of all ideological persuasions resorted to anti-Western rhetoric, understanding that it was the most popular stance among all strata of the Russian population. Observers even started to talk about a new Cold War.[30]

 

With major changes in Russia�s leadership and the transfer of presidential power to Vladimir Putin, self-assertiveness in foreign policy became even stronger. During the first half-year of his presidency, Putin strongly pushed for the adoption of major documents regarding national security, military development and foreign policy. The documents � the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine, and the Foreign Policy Concept � mirrored earlier perceptions that the West/USA does not consider Russia a full-scale partner in foreign affairs. These documents were a response to perceived Western attempts to isolate Russia from decision-making on major international issues and to create a potential threat to Russia�s national security by expanding military infrastructures.

 

The National Security Concept describes the current system of international relations as under rapid transformation.[31] According to the Concept, Russia supports the ideology of a multipolar world established on this basis of comprehensive mechanisms for the multilateral management of international issues. At the same time the document criticises attempts to create a structure of international relations based on the dominance of the international community by the developed Western nations led by the USA. This is designed to impose unilateral, primarily military, solutions to international problems, in violation of the basic norms of international law.

 

The Military Doctrine, which followed the adoption of the National Security Concept, declares Russia�s military structure to be defensive in nature.[32] However, for the first time in the post-Gorbachev years, it upholds Russia�s right to first use of its nuclear capabilities. Among other things, the Doctrine considers attempts to prevent Russia from participating in solving international problems and in multilateral actions to be intended to prevent it growing stronger and developing into one of the influential centres of the multipolar world. It sees the expansion of existing military blocs and alliances as serious external threats to Russia�s security. The Doctrine proclaims� Russia's readiness to protect its security by all means, including the use of nuclear weapons, to guarantee a high level of destruction to any aggressors, whether a nation or an international coalition. Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a tool for deterring aggression, enhancing its military security, and supporting international stability and peace. Thus, Russia maintains its right to use nuclear weapons in critical situations.

 

It was not by chance that the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (June 2000) claimed it necessary to review the general situation, since the expectations of equal, mutually advantageous, relations between Russia and the world, envisaged by the Substantive Provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (authorised by President Yeltsin on 23 April 1993) appeared groundless.[33] The concept seeks to preserve the Russian Federation's status as a great power and one of the influential centres in the modern world. It confirms the priority of �the conventional norms of international law�, above all, the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter, and speaks about equality and partnership relations between states as a basis of international relations. According to the Concept, Russia sees itself as an active player in the process of fundamental and dynamic changes in the modern world, and wants to be a key influence on the formation of a new world order.

 

In fact, with Putin coming into office, Russian foreign policy came a full circle, returning to the level of anti-Westernism present as before Gorbachev�s perestroika. This is a result of Russia�s failure to determine its place in international affairs. At the same time, Putin�s unexpected popularity was created by depicting him as a hardliner and a �strong arm�, able to protect Russia's national interests, both domestically and internationally. Under such circumstances, an anti-American and anti-Western trend was a logical development in Russian foreign policy.

 

On the whole, from the point of view of accommodating to new realities, perceptions and demands, Russia�s Northeast Asian policy since the failure of� the 1991 coup d��tat may be roughly divided into three periods:

1991-1993 - a period characterised by uncertainty and attempts to find an adequate place under the general paradigm of cooperation with the West;

1994-1998 - a period characterised by an emerging Russo-Chinese �strategic partnership� with the major paradigm in coping with challenges from the West, but lacking an active Russian position toward the Asia Pacific.

1999- 2001 - a period characterised by attempts to re-establish Russia�s status as a great power, and to demonstrate an independent foreign policy, with moves to re-establish Soviet-type relations with China and North Korea.

 

After September 11, there were significant attempts to change the paradigm of Russia�s relations with the West. Though Putin�s administration pretends that they highly evaluate the achievements of 2000 and 2001 in �Eastern� policy, it is still unclear how they will make compatible �Eastern� and �Western� lines in Russia�s foreign policy.

 

The trends of 1996-98 demonstrated that the �Chinese option�, which seemed overwhelming in Russia�s Asian policy, appeared neither comprehensive, nor ideal for the future evolution of Russian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific or Northeast Asia. It was assumed with little dissent that cooperation with the PRC would be better complemented by more productive relations with Japan and the Republic of Korea, primarily in economic fields, but also for the sake of a more balanced regional policy. Though the option of an �Oriental riposte� to NATO�s eastward expansion was much discussed in Moscow, in the form of a kind of �Russia-China+� axis to meet Western challenges, Russia also did not want to take the risk of further alienation and isolation from the world within the framework of a pseudo-alliance with China. Therefore even conservative political forces, notorious for their anti-Westernism and anti-NATO stance, began to debate the possibility of more cooperative overtures to Japan and both Koreas to counterbalance the new constraints in Europe by further cooperation with Asia.

 

On the surface, the changes in Russian policy towards East Asia appear inconsistent, especially in comparison with its rigid stance of the past. However, one can begin from the premise that the underlying motive in foreign policy, which became even more evident after Putin's accession, is that Russia, while accepting that it would be unrealistic to aspire to superpower status in the foreseeable future, wants to be recognised once more as a great power. Once this constant is recognised, the initial changes and �zigzags� in foreign policy make far more sense.

 

An article in the �Economist� identified three objectives in Russia�s approach to the outside world.[34] The first is to seek good ties with the West. The second is to play geopolitical games aimed at undermining American world �hegemony�. The third is to consolidate Russian influence in the former Soviet empire. In practice this means that the Russian leadership has tried to secure the former USSR�s territory as the zone of its foremost interests; that would mean a free hand in solving� not only internal conflicts,� like Chechnya, but also external disputes such as those with Georgia or Ukraine. Outside the former Soviet bloc, Russia would like to see the West seeking its opinion and advice as proof of the recognition of its great power status. In order to achieve this, and counteract US dominance in world affairs, Russia is experimenting with different policies, including a new approach towards East Asia that would support its aspiration to retain such a status.

 

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Endnotes