Japan: John Foster Dulles must
be rejoicing in his grave[63]
The potential for Russo-Japanese
relations in all areas greatly exceeds the present reality. However, to develop
this potential demands a new ideology of relations, and its reflection in
appropriate policies by both countries.
What is preventing the development of this new ideology is Japan's insistence on solving the territorial problem on Japanese terms,
a formula that psychologically Russia cannot accept. Thus, there is no radical
improvement of relations, as both sides beat about the bush, moving slowly
and going nowhere.[64] It
is clear that the territorial problem cannot be solved by the old system of
approaches, for any outcome will mean that one of the two sides has lost.
That is why, despite all Yeltsins public and private promises, no islands
could be given up and, hence, the object in view - signing the peace treaty
before the end of 2000 could not be achieved. There are even fewer reasons
for Putin to make concessions.
Resolution lies
within the framework of a new ideology. This ideology presumes that in the face
of new geopolitical and domestic challenges Russia and Japan would become natural strategic partners or even
allies in Northeast Asia. From this point of view, the problem of the
islands would be transformed from a strategic obstacle in development of
Russo-Japanese relations to a small tactical handicap. The two nations require
a cooperative arrangement, broader and more comprehensive than a peace treaty.
The basic strategic
challenge for Russia is not only the shortage of financial and
demographic resources for economic development of Siberia and the Far East, but the prospect of losing this gigantic region
to more dynamic neighbours. To preserve control over these territories Russia will have to invite outside developers on an
ad-hoc basis, and Japan appears to be one option. Moreover, such cooperation might become the
basis of a new pattern of relations in the Asia-Pacific. At the same time Russia and Japan share other common concerns: reunification of Korea, a strengthening China, the US role in the region, and Japans prospects for becoming a permanent member of the
UN Security Council. Indeed, Russias and Japans interests in foreign affairs coincide to a high
degree. With recognition of these common interests, the problem of the South Kuriles/Northern Territories could easily be resolved. This
is how many politicians in Russia perceive the situation.[65]
Actually, this is a traditional approach,
which formed the basis of Russias Japanese policy under Gorbachev. Approaches to Japan by the Yeltsin administration were more realistic
than in the Gorbachev period, even in the initial period of pro-Western
romanticism. The major difference is that Yeltsins administration had no
illusions about Japanese interest in Siberian economic development allegedly
outweighing the political significance of the peace treaty and solution of the
territorial dispute. For the team of experts on Northeast Asia under Yeltsin it was obvious that the model of mutually complementary
Russian and Japanese economies in vogue in the 1970s had become past history.
Therefore Yeltsin was ready to face the territorial issue as the biggest
obstacle to the normalisation of Russo-Japanese ties,
evident even from his earlier five-stage plan to improve Soviet-Japanese
relations, initially presented in January 1989.
At the same time, a realistic understanding of
the situation did not mean that final mutually acceptable solutions were ready
to be implemented. A common feature of both Gorbachevs and Yeltsins
approaches was the recognition that the problem really existed, while evading
practical solutions and postponing them for future generations to devise.
Yeltsins early five-stage plan assumed final settlement in the twenty-first
century.
However, the Yeltsin administration's early
realism was largely misunderstood by the Japanese government as readiness to
return the four disputed islands. Euphoria after the failure of the coup dtat encouraged wishful thinking in Japan. In practice Russias new vision assumed a wish for compromise on both
sides rather than unilateral Russian concessions under a face-saving scheme, as
proposed by Japan. Though on the eve of the delayed presidential visit to Tokyo in 1992 several options were debated, none of them assumed the return
of the Northern
territories; even
those words were rather unacceptable to the Russian side. Under the most
radical option, Moscow was prepared to discuss territorial delimitation on
the basis of earlier agreements assuming the validity of the 1956 Joint
Declaration, which envisaged the transfer to Japan of Shikotan
and the Habomai islands after conclusion of the peace
treaty. This was supplemented by the Gromyko-Matsumoto
exchange of letters declaring that the issues of Iturup
(Etorofu) and Kunashir (Kunashiri) islands should be the subject of further
negotiations. Therefore a 2+2 option was the maximum possible, a Russian
concession assuming there were strong legal arguments for Russia to retain sovereignty over Kunashir
and Iturup.
Although Japan finally recognised
Russias uneasiness over the negative attitudes of domestic public opinion, an
even greater obstacle was the fact that the so-called iriguchi
ron (input
vision, which makes solution of the territorial dispute a precondition for any
other cooperation) advocated by the Japanese Foreign Ministry since the 1980s
promised little to the Russian leadership, and domestic political risks seemed
too high an outcome for the Japanese approach.[66]
The Japanese position effectively deprived the Russian administration of space
for political manoeuvre both in bilateral
negotiations and in changing domestic public opinion. Two basic features of the
Japanese stand proved unacceptable for Russia:[67]
First, the claim for all four islands
under dispute was uncompromising, the maximum Japanese concession being
acceptance of the term of residual sovereignty, as in the case of Okinawa when under American control, and extending the preparatory period for
handover. Obviously Japan expected that after the demise of the USSR and the loss of largely Russian-populated territories
in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and the Baltic nations, Russia would not be interested in keeping small remote
islands.
Second, the above mentioned principle
of iriguchi ron stating that the territorial dispute
should be settled first, and only then would other subjects, including large
scale economic cooperation, be discussed.
In 1992-1993, despite narrowing the gap
between them, the two sides failed to reach a common approach to the
territorial problem, and had not prepared any valid economic projects. Russian
public opinion's rejection of a territorial deal was much discussed
domestically in the early 1990s, and served as a major argument for Russian officials
in their debates with the Japanese. When Russia understood that no satisfactory compromise might be
found in the near future, politicians began losing interest in Japanese
affairs, and eventually debates over new strategic approaches to Japan began to subside. Japan, on the other hand, realised
that the territorial dispute could not be solved by a frontal assault, and
concentrated its efforts on changing Russian public opinion. Indeed, the period
1993-1997 was marked by a high level of activity in the Russian mass media by
the Japanese embassy in Moscow.
The two nations cooperated to ensure that
Yeltsins visit to Tokyo in
November 1993 was untroubled. Although the Tokyo Declaration signed by Yeltsin
and Prime Minister Hosokawa[68]
was described as opening a new stage in bilateral relations, the visit
demonstrated the lack of significant progress. The Tokyo Declaration in reality
appeared nothing more than new words defining the same state of affairs that
resulted from Gorbachevs visit in 1989. Again both nations recognised
the existence of a territorial dispute over four islands, stressing the
importance of observing previous international agreements. Like Gorbachev,
Yeltsin carefully avoided even mentioning the 1956 Joint Declaration. What was
evaluated as a great step forward was a promise to find a solution based on
justice and international law. This principle soon proved a new disguise for
old disagreements. Anecdotally, the stress on international law enabled Russia and Japan to change nothing in their initial stands and
arguments, appealing to mutually contradictory international documents of
1944-1956. The formula of justice only provided space for a wide range of
interpretations - from the Japanese right to claim the entire Kurile chain to endorsement of the legacy of the post-war
status quo.
In practice, with the 1993 Tokyo Declaration
the two nations again agreed to disagree. This time Japan needed space to prepare new overtures, and Russia, deprived of its earlier expectations, was satisfied
with the status-quo. Meanwhile, insistent Japanese references to the 1956 Joint
Declaration actually validated the existing situation, as the Declaration
stipulated that the islands of Shikotan and Habomai, to say nothing of Kunashir
and Iturup, would be ceded to Japan only after signature of the peace treaty. The
disappearance of ungrounded expectations from relations with Japan opened a way for Russia to freeze the situation by simply abandoning
concessions over issues crucial for the peace treaty, albeit at the expense of
extensive cooperation with Japan in other areas.
On the other hand, Russia demonstrated its de
facto approach to the territorial dispute by authorising
its marine border guards to fire on Japanese fishing boats in the vicinity of
the disputed islands as part of the so-called Putina
(Summer Fishery) annual campaign to protect the 200-mile Exclusive Economic
Zone, including the disputed islands, from illegal fishing (until 1994 firing
was prohibited, and that allowed high-speed Japanese boats to escape in most
cases). It became obvious that the Russian administration preferred its own
interpretation of the status quo, leaving full administrative control over the
islands and adjacent waters in its hands. The major area of disagreement in
negotiations is the issue of administration, i.e. which side may have a right
to control fishery in the region. Russia states that territories under its control are subject
to Russian law, and therefore to its marine border and administrative measures.
Japan cannot accept this stand, which assumes Russian
sovereignty over the disputed area.
In 1996 Japan initiated a new round of reconciliatory actions. An
extensive exchange of visits by foreign ministers - five times within a year -
encouraged a new Russian initiative for the joint economic development of the
disputed islands presented by foreign minister Yevgeny
Primakov in December. The new Russian move may
certainly be assessed as a retreat from options under discussion in 1992 and a
return to the earlier ideas of the Gorbachev administration in 1989. The
concessionary mood of the new Japanese approach to Russia was clearly demonstrated by its rather unexpected
readiness to consider not only the plan in detail, but also fishery problems
around the islands and compensation payments to the population as well. Japan also agreed to cooperate in the security field, and
to exchanges of visits by top officials from the two countries defense
departments. Contacts between the Russian Defense Ministry and the Japanese
National Security Agency followed, and there was an exchange of visits by their
heads, Usui and Rodionov,
in 1996-1997 to expand bilateral contacts.
A very important feature in this context is
preservation of the territorial dispute as the major theme for Japanese policy
towards Russia, irrespective of other areas of dialogue. Though important by
themselves, they represent lower political value for Japan, and strategically are used as an instrument to meet
Russian requirements for broader contacts and induce Moscow to find a more favourable
solution to the protracted territorial dispute. Russia also discovered a strong interest in expanding
dialogue with Japan in the same years. The most important factor may be associated with its
growing feeling of isolation and containment, fostered by NATOs eastward
expansion.
A real breakthrough in the negotiations was
created by the so-called Hashimoto doctrine. In July 1997 then Japanese Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto formulated three
principles for relations with Russia: mutual trust, mutual benefit and a long-term
perspective to create a solid foundation for the 21st century. The
doctrine opened the road for two semi-formal Russo-Japanese summits, in
November 1997 at Krasnoyarsk, and in April 1998 at Kawana.
In Krasnoyarsk Hashimoto managed to avoid the territorial dispute and
concentrate on the peace treaty; this fully coincided with Russian priorities. Russia received a signal that Japan could be more flexible in the dispute, and was ready
to expand cooperation in other areas.
However, the Japanese agreement to sign a
peace treaty (Yeltsin and Hashimoto agreed to sign it by the year 2000[69])
was based on the presumption that this would ensure Japan acquired at least nominal sovereignty over the
disputed islands, and a framework agreement on economic cooperation reached in Krasnoyarsk could not substitute for the dispute itself. In Kawana Russia tried to continue maintaining silence over the
dispute, but Hashimoto issued a new initiative, suggesting replacing the
formula returning the Northern Territories with the notion of border delimitation. The move was apparently
designed to soften the language and to make the issue more acceptable to the
Russian public.[70]
Hashimotos initiative did not meet a positive response, since Russia favoured introduction of a
special regime, which would preserve Russian sovereignty over the islands in
one form or another.
Following the Kawana
pattern, Russia and Japan signed the 1998 Moscow Declaration[71]
on establishing a so-called Creative Partnership between the two nations. But
the real outcome of the document, which provided yet another promise to sign
the peace treaty, and again avoided the territorial dispute as such, was the
decision to create two subcommissions on economic
cooperation, and on border delimitation. In fact, it was difficult to expect
new initiatives to be advanced during Prime Minister Obuchis
visit to Moscow (November 1998), following Russias August 1998 economic crisis. One of the first oral
messages from the newly-elected Russian President Vladimir Putin
was the rejection of the idea that Russia might transfer the islands to Japan. During Putins official
visit to Japan in September 2000, Russia and Japan signed a Program for Cooperative Exploration of the South Kuriles. This was designed to become a framework for other
contracts and projects of cooperation in the South Kuriles.[72] However, the peace treaty, which Boris Yeltsin had
promised would be signed by the end of 2000, was postponed yet again. Prime
Minister Yoshiro Mori tried to appeal to the Kawana
initiative, but Putin responded with a statement
that the initiative did not fully mirror Russian understanding of the problem.
However, he recognised the existence of the
territorial dispute, and promised to work towards its solution.
Disappointed over failed expectations for
Japanese financial aid and investment in the region, Russia does not value further dialogue on the territorial
problem. Japans economic difficulties, which have resulted in reduced purchases of Russia's traditional exports, likewise have done nothing to
stimulate Russias interest in bilateral cooperation, and, unlike for Japan, the territorial dispute is not among Russias first priorities. Thus it easily broke its promise
to sign the peace treaty by the year 2000, and without serious stimuli can
actually postpone the settlement for a long time.
