China: Strategic partnership of outsiders

 

Russia’s approach towards East Asia does not have a sufficiently comprehensive vision of this difficult region as a whole. Basically, Russian policy in the region is simply a sum of bilateral ties, mainly with China, Japan and the Koreas. Russia's rapprochement with China appears to be one of its most significant foreign policy achievements.

 

For at least three decades relations between Moscow and Beijing were based on the triangular interdependent logic of a balance of power between the USSR, the United States and China. The level of confrontation between the participants and their power potential largely determined the functions of the triangle. The logic assumed that the two weaker and/or more passive sides would cooperate to meet the challenge of the one stronger and/or more active. In the 1970s, despite a supposed detente, the USSR was on the offensive, but in the late 1980s the United States gradually took a more active stance. Under these conditions, and within the logic of triangular relations, China then emphasised enhancing relations with the ‘weaker’ side - the USSR. 

 

With the collapse of the USSR the triangle also seemed to vanish. However, tensions between Russia and the West, confusion over relations among countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russia’s weak position in the Asia-Pacific region (aggravated by the unsettled territorial dispute with Japan) subsequently led the Russian leadership to return to triangular logic in its foreign policy course.

 

Thus, by the mid-1990s, a ‘triangular’ political motivation resurfaced in Russo-Chinese relations. During his visit to Beijing in January 1994, Foreign Minister Kozyrev proposed to elevate bilateral cooperation to the level of strategic partnership, an idea accepted by China after a period of hesitation.[35] The Joint Declaration signed during President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Moscow in September 1994 assessed Russo-Chinese ties as ‘new relations of cooperative partnership’.[36]

 

Russia's path to rapprochement with China was smoothed by the fact that the two countries could easily and with minimal effort support each other on two issues that were vital for them, i.e. NATO expansion and the Taiwan issue. The Joint Declaration signed during Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in April 1996 proved a new step forward, formulating ‘partnership relations of equality and confidence oriented towards strategic interaction in the 21st century’.[37] In the document China stated its understanding of Russia’s position against NATO's eastward movement, and supported Russia's actions to preserve the federation, assessing the Chechen issue as a domestic one. Russia in turn reiterated that the PRC government is the only legal administration to represent all of China, and Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory. Russia undertook not to establish official relations or develop official contacts with Taiwan. Russia also recognised Tibet as an integral part of China.

 

In general, during 1991-1996 Russo-Chinese relations furthered the debate on ‘partnership relations of equality and confidence oriented towards strategic interaction in the 21st century’ as a major issue. Besides, 1996 was marked by Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng’s visit to Moscow with an agreement to intensify top-level contacts, to meet not less than once a year, and to establish a business cooperation structure similar to the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission in US-Russian relations,[38] to meet not less than twice a year. In June 1997 the two governments signed a ten-year agreement to establish a ‘mechanism of regular meetings between the heads of the Russian and Chinese governments’.[39] The ‘mechanism’ is aimed at developing bilateral cooperation in the following fields: trade and economic ties, military exchanges, scientific cooperation, energy and nuclear energy production, and transportation. Within the framework of the ‘mechanism’ relevant commissions were established.

 

The April 1997 summit highlighted the desire to demonstrate to the international community (primarily the United States) the correlation of the geopolitical postures of the two nations, as represented in the Joint Declaration on the Multipolar World and Emerging New International Order (23 April 1997).[40] The document was unique for post-Soviet Russia as nothing of the kind was ever agreed with any other nation.  Both sides highly   praised the Declaration declaring it ‘a result of serious analysis of international relations in the post-confrontation period’, demonstrating common views and approaches towards the post-Cold war international situation.[41]

 

The Sino-Russian rapprochement is a reaction to the changing balance of power in world politics, enabling the two nations to act in parallel rather than declared or overt allies. Efforts to develop a strategic partnership seek to counter the US line of preserving a unipolar international system, and seek to establish multipolarity, with both countries playing independent roles. Hence the final objective of joint actions by Moscow and Beijing are concurrent self-determination, independent influence and separate bargaining positions rather than a close military and political alliance. It is not by chance that the search for terms defining stages of their bilateral cooperation is primarily a search for labels designed to attract the attention of third parties (specifically the United States and Japan). At the same time the absence of an alliance relationship between Russia and China is constantly stressed by both sides.[42]

 

China and Russia have successfully used the triangular relationship with the USA for their own interests. The verbal support Russia received from China on the question of NATO enlargement made it easier for Russia to bargain with the West and receive compensation in the form of participation in the Group of Seven leading industrial nations, to be admitted to the Paris Club of creditor countries,[43] and to restructure its debts with the London Club of private lenders.[44] The Krasnoyarsk meeting between Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto was the result of Russian efforts to obtain an alternative partner in Asia, and avoid being oriented exclusively toward China. Likewise, one of Tokyo’s main concerns was to balance stable relations with Russia against China’s growing power.

 

China seems to know better than Russia what to do with the possibilities open to it. In its turn, it was given an opportunity for constructive dialogue with the United States. As Li Fenglin, China’s Ambassador to Russia put it, ‘the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership ... does not rule out relations of partnership between other countries. Moreover, if the world’s major powers establish relations of partnership; this would benefit global peace and stability’.[45] In practical terms, China seeks to balance its relations with Russia by promoting ties with the USA. The formula of ‘strategic partnership’ that in 1996-1997 was to characterise the Sino-Russian relationship was discussed by Washington and Beijing as well.[46] Significantly, in 1996 China and Russia agreed to establish a ‘hot line’ between their two presidents, but actual implementation was postponed until a similar agreement came into force between China and the USA in 1998. Li Fenglin cited the following opinion on cooperative ties between the three parties: Beijing and Washington - cooperation without sentimentality; Beijing and Moscow - sentimentality without cooperation.[47] This appears apt.

 

China’s current assessment of the structure of international relations is based on the premise that power in the international arena is dispersing. Currently the USA is the only superpower in the world, but the Chinese believe its ability to influence international affairs will gradually diminish in the near future. In this assessment, the world is becoming a multipolar structure, in which the various powers are balanced, and large-scale military conflicts are unlikely.

 

In the new international situation China is to continue its policy of ‘maintaining independence and keeping initiative in their hands’. That means China intends to independently determine its position on the world stage, refuses to participate in any alliance and arms race, and develops cooperative relations with all nations of the world on the basis of the ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’.[48] Essentially, Beijing is being pragmatic, and does not want any ideological community or dispute to determine its international relations. It has removed most ideological constraints on its foreign policy to avoid ideological and geopolitical factors prevailing over economic expediency.

 

China, while striving for economic cooperation with the USA and being extremely interested in hi-tech US products, absolutely rejects the current thrust of US foreign policy, which seeks to prevent the country’s unification. Reunification with Taiwan is an ultimate goal of the PRC’s leadership. It is under these circumstances that China is interested in counterbalancing US domination in the world. While this was apparent years ago, recent events have made this trend dominant. To this end, strengthening an alliance with Russia seems to be a good option. Russia is weak, but can offer resources and advanced weapons. From Russia’s perspective, perceived US attempts to block Russia all around the world, including the CIS,[49] have made it even more desperate to acquire reliable allies in the world.

 

By signing two agreements on border delimitation in 1991 and 1995, Russia and China have settled their territorial dispute. In 1992 they signed a memorandum that provided for radical cuts in forces and weapons along their shared border. In 1994 they adopted a declaration on mutual non-targeting of strategic nuclear missiles, and reinforced their undertakings not to be first to use nuclear weapons against each other. In 1996 China and four CIS nations (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) signed an agreement on border confidence-building measures (CBMs), supplemented in April 1997 by an agreement on mutual reduction of armed forces along their borders.[50] Despite their importance, these agreements ensure nothing more than stabilisation of the current balance of forces along the Russo-Chinese border, and are essentially symbolic in support of broader political declarations.

 

More significantly, in late 1997 the two nations completed six years of work between government bodies on demarcating the Sino-Russian border. The final demarcation agreement undoubtedly has a deep influence on relations between the two countries. It curbs a strong irritant for both sides and eliminates possible territorial claims, above all Chinese claims to the Primorye region of Russia.

 

The year 2001 brought a new peak in bilateral relations, with the signing of the Sino-Russian good-neighbourly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (16 July 2001).[51] Though the document was praised as heralding a new era in bilateral relationships, in fact the Treaty merely endorsed agreements previously reached on issues of common interest, confirming the importance of all documents signed by the two nations in 1992-2000. The treaty also confirmed their vision of the UN and the system of international law as the bases for a new fair and rational world order. The major issue agreed upon in the Treaty is the long-term development of Sino-Russian relationships of good neighborliness and friendship, equal partnership, and strategic cooperation. The two nations promised to transfer friendship from generation to generation.

 

Each again expressed support for the other over issues of territorial integrity and national unity, and both declared that there were no territorial disputes between them. Each rejected actions or participation in alliances or agreements directed against the other’s security, and they agreed to consult immediately if either perceived a threat to peace and security.

 

Equal partnership and strategic cooperation is to be conducted through regular bilateral summits and meetings, regular exchanges of opinions and consolidation of positions on bilateral ties and important international issues. Both pledged to make every effort to uphold the global strategic balance and stability, and to strengthen cooperation within the UN and its Security Council.

 

Although on the eve of signing the Friendship Treaty there were plentiful rumors about a special agreement on military cooperation between the two countries, the emergence of a Russo-Chinese military and political alliance seems unlikely, as their geopolitical and strategic national interests do not coincide. China would rather avoid the prospect of taking part in a conflict in remote Europe in the event of a strain in NATO-Russian relations. Likewise, Russia also would not wish to endanger its relations with the United Nations, Japan and other Asia-Pacific nations in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or a serious confrontation over territorial claims on islands in the South China or East China seas. At the same time both nations are ready to develop military-technical cooperation, a major driving force for their current ties.

 

At the moment, despite further attempts to strengthen political cooperation between the two nations, and shared dissatisfaction over the increasingly aggressive US stance in international affairs, it does not appear that the new Treaty will lead to the creation of an anti-US alliance.[52] Neither China nor Russia is interested in worsening its relations with the USA, though, as the crisis over the US surveillance aircraft showed, they might be prepared to take steps to prevent the USA going too far in pursuing its unique self- appointed role of ‘policing’ the contemporary world. Russia and China seek each other’s support and try to coordinate their political efforts to ensure the role of the UN Security Council (and consequently their own role) in international affairs, to prevent NATO from gaining control over the UN Security Council. Both countries opposed the deployment of Theatre Missile Defense and abandonment of the 1971 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The two nations also voice objections to interference on allegedly humanitarian grounds in internal affairs. This is actually a continuation of old discussions on human rights and separatist movements, which in their view apparently include Chechnya, Kosovo and Taiwan. However, none of this implies outright hostility to the USA.

 

Economic interaction in civil areas is not yet important enough to influence political cooperation. Nevertheless, the leadership of both nations understands the importance of a stable economic basis for an effective bilateral political relationship, and tries to stimulate economic ties through administrative bodies. In other words, the political motivations in Russo-Chinese relations heavily outweigh economic considerations, unlike Chinese cooperation with the United States and Japan, where economic interests help to soften political contradictions.

 

It should be noted that Russia does not have a unified vision of prospects for its relationship with China. It is obvious that the reforms promote an increase in China's status, from regional power to global superpower. Currently, both nations use each other to counterbalance American or Japanese regional dominance. Yet the emergence of China as a global superpower may conflict with Russia’s strategic interests, particularly if China succeeds in becoming an active and important partner of the Asia-Pacific nations, her ultimate regional goal. Simultaneously China would compete with the United States and Japan for the leading role in the Pacific Rim.

 

A number of different evaluations of favourable and unfavourable factors in Chinese social development, and differing assessments of the problems confronting China and of its leadership's abilities to cope with them, provoke conflicting forecasts. There exists a pessimistic vision of Chinese prospects, which stresses the probability of isolationism, regionalisation with only a formal feeling of national identity and unity, and fluctuations and hesitations in political options. At the same time there are also quite positive forecasts of the China's complete integration into the world economy without its posing a military or political threat to neighboring nations. Judging by economic factors alone, a negative scenario seems highly improbable in the next two decades. However, the social and economic transformation of China creates the conditions for a deep crisis of social institutions, i.e. contradictions between central government and provinces as well as between provinces, growing social strain, increasing discrepancy between an archaic political system and a modernising economy, and deepening ethnic problems. Hence any prognosis of the nature of the post-Deng Xiaoping regime is hard to evaluate, whether it be authoritarian, the return of an old ideologically indoctrinated elite, the ascendancy of radical reformers, or the persistence of the existing symbiotic regime.

 

Taking these hypothetical scenarios, pessimists assess China as a potential threat to Russia, either as an authoritarian state with growing military might, or as a nation doomed to repeat the fate of the USSR with unforeseen consequences. Therefore they advise avoidance of measures strengthening China, especially any involving weapons and weapons technologies.[53] Optimists believe that the Chinese leadership is able to manage the nation, a scenario corresponding to Russian interests. This vision assesses China's military build-up as modernisation of a backward army, without possible threats to the region, except, perhaps, Taiwan, which in any case is viewed as China’s domestic affair. The optimistic vision has recently prevailed among Russia's leadership.

 

However, the ‘Economist’ made a reasonable observation,[54] arguing that the Sino-Russian ‘strategic partnership’ - not a military alliance but a paradigm for a new international order, in which Russia and China are to be forever friends, never foes - partly supported Russia in its activities at the G8 summits. The partnership envisaged by the new Treaty is meant to be an eyeful for the real power in the post-cold-war world, America. However, the ‘Economist’ argued that there is something else, both more and less, behind the vows of Sino-Russian friendship than an anti-American huddle. Russia and China still worry about each other, not just about America.

 

Nevertheless, the future of Russo-Chinese relations largely depends on American foreign policy, i.e. the results of US engagement policy towards China, and the level of trust in Russian-American cooperation. Apparently, ideological considerations complicate the improvement of US-Chinese relations. The American aversion for any kind of totalitarianism and its periodic campaigns on human rights in China preserve mutual distrust. Unless the United States plays down these tendencies in its approach to China, Beijing will always have a strong motivation for closer ties with Moscow. For its part, Russia's perception of being duped, isolated and neglected by the West pushes her to find a key partner in China.

 

Therefore, the Russian-Chinese ‘strategic partnership’ is motivated by a mutual desire for rapprochement (within the logic of triangular relations), the key factor in their cooperation being determined by a shared pressure to meet real or perceived challenges from the West. The two sides are seeking opportunities to overcome possible isolation in international affairs and improve their capacity to promote specific national interests vis-à-vis uncooperative Western nations. Such cooperation was facilitated by an absence of overlapping or conflicting national priorities, enabling them to provide each other with mutual verbal support without essential expenditures or sacrifices. On the other hand, all this has made for vague sloganising and insufficient practical understanding of the essence of the proclaimed partnership in the context of bilateral cooperation. This can be also seen in the low level of political coordination over Asia-Pacific regional issues.

 

Recently the two nations have started to develop political consultation. Looking back to the Yugoslav crisis, one will see that in the wake of the Chinese Embassy bombing, Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russian President’s Special Envoy to Yugoslavia, arrived in Beijing on 11 May 1999. Agreement for the visit was reached in a phone conversation between President Yeltsin and his Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin, in which they discussed the situation in Yugoslavia and condemned NATO’s action as barbaric.[55] On his arrival, Chernomyrdin held talks with President Jiang and Premier Zhu, at which the two sides agreed that the only way to solve the Kosovo crisis was politically.[56] They also shared the opinion that the solution to the crisis elaborated at the Group of Eight (the G7 plus Russia) could be implemented only after termination of air strikes. Preparation of an appropriate resolution for adoption by the UN Security Council was also discussed. China and Russia shared the view of the USA as using NATO to put under its command not only European structures (OSCE, EU), but also the UN.

 

There was nothing new in the political postures of the two sides. The most significant thing was that the two countries began to adjust their stances on foreign policy issues through political consultations. Moreover, 1998 witnessed the creation of a group for such consultations. Russia and China have been holding bilateral consultations since late 1998 on how to cope with the US proposal to develop an antimissile system to shield itself and its allies. China proposed working-level talks, and security experts from the foreign and defence ministries of the two countries have been meeting every two months to exchange information about the theatre missile defence (TMD) system. The two countries were even expected to come to a decision on a united approach, which could take the form of a joint request to the USA and Japan[57] to terminate development of the TMD program, or even on joint deployment of a weapons system to counter the US missile shield. Russia was initially cool to China's proposal for talks, but eventually relented in the wake of mounting disappointment with the USA, when Washington ignored Moscow's calls to stop the bombing of Iraq in December 1998.

 

Russia expressed concern that the proposed missile shield would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed by Russia and the USA in 1972. Increasing its criticism, Russia signed a protocol with the US in September 1997 approving TMD research as long as it does not infringe the conditions of the ABM Treaty. When the United States notified Russia that it intended to pull out of the 1972 Treaty, starting a six-month timetable for withdrawal and opening the way for creation of an anti-missile defence system,[58] this development could   have been taken by Russia as a further humiliation. However, the Russian response was mild, and Putin tried to downgrade the importance of this step, simply calling it a ‘mistake’ that did not threaten Russia's national security.[59]

 

For its part, China opposed the TMD, as Taiwan wanted to come under its umbrella, and China’s Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan even stated that China could not rule out the use of force in pursuit of its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, should the island come under the TMD. Following the US decision to pull out of the ABM Treaty, and Russia's receipt of some benefits in exchange (such as the US-Russian nuclear arms reduction agreement,  and a pact with  NATO that made Russia a limited  partner of the alliance,  thus  further improving Russia's relationship with  the West), ‘Renmin Ribao’ published  a comment to the effect that the basic nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership  allowed China and Russia to cooperate with third countries if this did not harm the national interests of either.[60] The US-Russian nuclear arms reduction agreement, for example, also corresponded with China’s nuclear security interests. The newspaper pointed out that the Sino-Russian strategic co-operation agreement was based on the two nations' common interests, and China had played an active role in supporting Russia's diplomatic struggle in the area of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because it believed that disrupting strategic stability would hurt both countries. At the same time, the comment contained a reminder: any unilateral action by either that harms the two countries’ strategic co-operation may harm the national interests of the country initiating such action.

 

‘Renmin Ribao’ also argued that a certain change in Sino-Russian strategic co-operation had been caused by the Russian government's policy adjustment, and also by the change in the international situation. The Russian Government had stopped talking about the creation of a multi-polar world and opposition to unilateralism, the former theoretical base of the Sino-Russian strategic co-operation. The US withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had also changed the parameters of cooperation between Russia and China over maintaining strategic stability. The US military deployment in Central Asia for operations in Afghanistan after September 11 2001 had undermined the functioning of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, and complicated regional security cooperation between China and Russia.

 

This perception of alienation between the two ‘strategic partners’ is obvious not only on the Chinese side. The first half of 2002 unexpectedly saw the growth of anti-Chinese sentiments among representatives of the Russian political elite.[61] On this basis, there are signs of growing deterioration in bilateral relations.  Russia stopped paying attention to military contacts with China, its Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov avoided meeting Chinese generals visiting Moscow, and the channel for Sino-Russian consultations and opinion exchanges on enhancing world strategic stability was frozen.[62]

 

At this point, Russo-Chinese friendship based on ‘equal partnership and strategic cooperation’ appears to lack adequate internal motivation, and to be highly determined by the international environment. Narrow isolationism and increasing tension with the West does not meet the optimal preferences of either, and both would prefer to diversify their international connections.  Their kind of quasi-alliance would appear to be nothing more than elaborate tactics for meeting a worst-case scenario imposed from outside.

 

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Endnotes